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Conclusions
The symbol was force as a compass needle or a triangle was force, as the mechanist might prove by losing it, and nothing could be gained by ignoring their value. Symbol or energy, the Virgin had acted as the greatest force the We stern world ever felt, and had drawn man's activities to herself more strongly than any other power, natural or supernatural, had ever done; the historian's business was to follow the track of that energy .... Thus far, no path had led anywhere .... The secret of education still hid itself somewhere behind ignorance, and one fumbled over it as feebly as ever. In such labyrinths, the staff is a force almost more necessary than the legs; the pen becomes a sort of blind-man's dog, to keep him from falling into the gutters.
The pen works for itself, and acts like a hand, modelling the plastic material over and over again to the form that suits it best. The form is never arbitrary, but is a sort of growth like crystallization, as any artist knows too well; for often the pencil or pen runs into side-paths and shapelessness, loses its relations, stops or is bogged .... Compelled once more to lean heavily on this support, Adams covered more thousands of pages with figures as formal as though they were algebra.
-Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams
Any reader who has made it through the preceding six chapters has had ample exposure to the paradoxes and vicissitudes of aesthetics; none theless, it may be appropriate to recapitulate this book's principal claims. I began by noting the peculiarly hyperbolic reception literary theory has enjoyed, or suffered, over the past two decades, and I proposed that we understand "theory" as a shadow cast by our culture's deeply entrenched aesthetic ideology. The symptomatic equation of theory with "deconstruc tion" in general and Paul de Man in particular derives from the tense intimacy between theory and aesthetics: aesthetics depends on, exploits, and represses a linguistic predicament that de Man's rhetorical project both repeats and describes. Aesthetics seeks to discover in the sign's arbitrari ness a disinterestedness that would guarantee signification itself-thereby guaranteeing the unity and health of the mind, the purposive structure of history, and the definition and destiny of humanity. Through a programma tic misrecognition of language, humanity and history become processes 201 grounded in language, as the word Bildung so evocatively suggests. And we have seen that, on the one hand, this linguistic gambit grants aesthetics enormous practical force. As a system based on formalization per se, aes thetics is a model ideology that can be deployed wherever or whenever differences and identities need to be naturalized. Indeed, aesthetics suc ceeds precisely because of its radical incoherence: unable to guarantee its own production, it projects its possibility into the past and the future as the historical myth of Bildung, and thereby becomes a highly supple myth of history. But, on the other hand, the same incoherence that grants aesthetics totalizing power also renders it an uncertain enterprise, vulnerable to para noid fantasies and perpetually open to a critique which it both forwards and forecloses. The seemingly modest and pedantic project of "theory" occurs as an exacerbation, and critical repetition, of this double bind within the institution of aesthetic pedagogy.
The link between theory and literature-such that theory (as "deconstruction" ) is always "literary" theory-stems from the fact that aesthetics discovers its most fully realized model in the idea of literature as an autoproductive and self-reflexive linguistic event. The literature depart ment of the modem university draws its rationale more directly than any other academic institution from the ideology of the aesthetic, and for this reason has remained stubbornly identified with theory's production, despite the manifestly interdisciplinary reach of theoretical discourse. My analysis of aesthetics consequently discovered in the academic debate about the Bildungsroman an overdetermined site of aesthetic contradiction. As we saw, the paradoxes of the Bildungsroman repeat those of aesthetics generally. The genre expands to include any text that can be figured as a subject producing itself in history, which is to say any text whatsoever; it simultaneously shrinks to an elite, high-cultural coterie-the five or so novels, for instance, which German studies repeatedly nominates as Bildungsromane-and then, when those novels are examined more closely, disappears into the degree zero de l'ecriture and becomes a mere fiction, discoverable everywhere only because it exists nowhere. The Bildungsro man is the pragmatic epitome of the "literary absolute," yet is also (there fore) suspiciously vulgar and perhaps even not truly literary. Its literari ness, that is, consists in nothing more or less than the ongoing self destruction of aesthetics.
Since the Bildungsroman as literary absolute founds itself on the obscure, exemplary self-knowledge of the literary text, the problem of this genre leads to that of reading specific novels. My interpretations of Bildungsromane by Goethe, Eliot, and Flaubert confirm the diagnoses that my first two chapters worked out in the more abstract terminology of theoretical or generic discourse. All of these texts explore, and ultimately exhaust, the resources of aesthetic or dialectical irony: that is, in various ways they are all anti-Bildungsromane which interrogate the possibility of recup�rating Bildung through negation. At a certain point, however, this story of mourning is interrupted by another figural narrative telling the story of a trauma of signification which inspires the negative, dialectical tale of mourning but remains inaccessible to it. My reading of L'Education sentimentale elicited "history" as the name for this trauma. History is the inscription, the cut, or the rupture, through which an event occurs as an event of signification, which defines but remains radically external to the symbolic orders of consciousness and meaning. In retrospect we may think of such opaque, disruptive moments as Mignon's identification with pup pets in the Lehrjahre or Madame Laure's murderous, unreadable blow in Middlemarch as these texts' allegories of the "historicity" of Bildung. The recuperation of this historicity as aesthetic historicism generates the symp tomatic figure of a mechanized, deformed, or dismembered body. The rav ages of Bildung express themselves as the puppet-like motions of Mignon's body in the Lehrjahre, as the trope of unstoppable disinterral and dissection in the Wa nderjahre, as a widespread mechanization of bodies in Eliot's writings, and as the fetishization and symbolic dispersal of Madame Ar noux in L'Education sentimentale.
Futhermore, these texts all characterize the automutilative dimension of aesthetic organicism as simultaneously irreducible and contingent. If bodies acquire their identity-their illusion of unity-only by opening themselves to dissection and dispersal, these destructive processes repre sent or enact the body's historical contingency. This point holds obvious interest as regards the enormously complex question of the relation be tween aesthetics and gender. It will not have escaped notice that the bodies being mechanized and dismembered in these texts are almost always female, and frequently maternal. Historical reasons for the mother's promi nence in these texts are not hard to come by. The construction, over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, of middle-class domes tic space around the erotic and tutelary figure of the mother, is a familiar story; and Friedrich Kittler has shown in great detail how pedagogical and aesthetic discourses in Germany around 1800 situated the mother at the origin of discourse.1 My account of the rhetorical instability of aesthetics then permits an explanation for the symbolic violence wreaked on the mother, though in offering it I must blur Kittler' s sharp historical focus.
During my brief analyses of Schiller's comments on the Lehrjahre and Sartre's comments on Flaubert, I suggested in both cases that the commen-tator's use of maternal imagery worked to naturalize textual production and ground semiotic difference in a binary opposition between the sexes with the result that the maternal figure was blamed for causing the linguis tic ambiguity she had been brought in to cure.2 A hundred and fifty years of history and any number of cultural differences separate Schiller from Sartre: in many contexts it would obviously make sense to claim that their notions of "nature" or the "maternal" are different, or that their texts stage different dramas of sexual difference. Yet it must also be said that it is not particularly surprising to discover a degree of overlap in their rhetorical vocabulary. "Europe," or the "West," in this context, is perhaps a useful category of analysis, and a hundred and fifty years a rather short amount of time. Both Flaubert and Sartre write within a modernity which, in this book, I have called the era of aesthetics. Nor, in such cases, can modernity be rendered a stable term, purged of historical sediments and scars. Femi nist scholars have documented the We stern tradition's long habit of identi fying "woman" with whatever "nature" means, on the one hand, and with rhetorical deceit or inessentiality, on the other; on this level of generality the problem of aesthetics merges with that of "phallogocentrism" as our cul ture's heaviest historical burden. 3 A full study, if such a thing were possible, 2. In my discussion of the Lehrjahre's displacement of oedipal narrative I also alluded to Cynthia Chase's remarkable recasting of Julia Kristeva's work on abjection. Kristeva's under standing of the maternal as a potential chaos that must be cast out or "abjected" if the infant is to enter the symbolic and imaginary orders provides a metapsychological narrative for ges tures such as Sartre's or Schiller's. Chase's reading of Kristeva emphasizes that the infant's dilemma is that of reading indeterminate marks of maternal care: a crucial point, since as I am about to argue, it is the radically indeterminate predicament of reading which allows us to see the "maternal" element in Kristeva's scheme as historical rather than natural. Kristeva has frequently been accused of reducing woman to the maternal, and of constructing a theory which makes misogyny a necessary dimension of language acquisition; however, if one reads this theory rhetorically, as Chase suggests, its explanatory mechanisms become more supple. of the gender politics of aesthetics would require among other things a careful reading of the Symposium, in which Diotima defines love as a long ing for "the procreation that the beautiful effects," and tropes this "procrea tion" as a male pregnancy and birth (to kuoun) effected by a female goddess, Beauty (he Kallone).4 From the transcendental orbit of the auto to kalon to the empirico-idealism of bourgeois aesthetics, sexual difference and female generativity recur as figures-often highly ambivalent figures-for the figurativeness of language. However, a rhetorical critique allows-even forces-one to add that they are not necessary figures. That is, the readings collected in this book, while not focused on the complex question of gender, can at least help emphasize that the master-tropes of patriarchy are no less historically contingent for having participated in the history of metaphysics itself.
The point is an important one, and it may be helpful to take a moment here to follow the ancient link between rhetoric and the feminine through one of its postmodern spirals. With the Neoplatonic tradition in mind, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe risks a counteridealist appropriation of the fig ure of "woman," claiming that "woman is at stake [in the aesthetic] because she represents, not as Hegel through Schiller would have liked, the sen suous itself in its opposition to the spiritual ... but the sensuous in its 'truth,' which is the 'truth' of figure and the fictional."5 This "other" Aphro dite would not be the goddess of male or metaphysical desire but rather "a figure figuring only the figure in its plasticity and thereby, in fact, the , 1973) . I thank Molly Ierulli for drawing my attention to this pas sage. Diotima goes on to explain that this longing for procreation is in fact the desire of a mortal being for immortality (207a): "Those whose procreancy is of the body turn to woman as the object of their love, and raise a family .... But those whose procreancy is of the spirit rather than of the flesh ... conceive and bear the things of the spirit" (208e-209a). And thus the ideal seeker would approach the "final revelation" of an immortal beauty that "subsists of itself and by itself in an eternal oneness [auto kath auto meth autou monoeides aei on]" (21ia-b). Oearly the figure of Diotima herself would repay close study in this context. A thematic reading that reduces her to the propositions she enunciates does not suffice, particularly since in this dialogue Socrates, the eiron, is ironically framed by Alcibiades as the greatest of all orators, whose philosophy "clings like an adder" (218a tutelary goddess of aesthetics" (Lacoue-Labarthe, "The Unpresentable," 156). Lacoue-Labarthe' s gamble replicates some of the problems and temp tations of Jacques Lacan's subtle and notorious claim that '"the' woman does not exist."6 It must at least be said that, precisely to the extent that aesthetics, as Lacoue-Labarthe claims, is "the locus where fiction, the fic tional in general, becomes worthy of theory" ( 151 ), the sexual identity of its goddess perhaps ought to be slightly more dubious. Insofar as aesthetics destabilizes its own binary oppositions, it means gender trouble, in Judith Butler's phrase.7 From Winckelmann to Baudelaire, Swinburne, and Wilde, modern aesthetics has provided a space for the production of alternative middle-class sexualities (alternative "male" ones, at any rate) at the same time (and for the same reason) that aesthetic theory has unfolded as an obsessive, and often obsessively binary and heterosexual, attention to gen der difference. Lacoue-Labarthe's insight into the fictionality of aesthetics is crucial to retain, precisely because one is thereby able to remark the apo-6. That is, woman in the abstract, la femme," does not exist" because the symbolic order relegates her to the position of fantasy (hence the correlative claim, "there is no sexual rela tion"). See in particular Lacan's essay "God and the /ouissance of'fhe Woman. A Love Letter," in Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the ecole freudienne, ed. Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose (New York: Norton, 1985), 137-6i. Even if restricted to texts rigorously attentive to the difficulties of Lacanian theory and the subtleties of its presentation, the bibliography on Lacan and "the woman" is massive and diverse: for two exemplary positions, see Stephen Heath, "Difference," Screen 19.3 (1978) : 51-112, who argues that Lacan covertly naturalizes sexual difference and reiterates phallocentric ideology, and Jacqueline Rose, "Introduction II" in Femi nine Sexuality, 27-57, who does not contest Lacan's participation in "the phallocentrism he described," but insists on the "symbolic and arbitrary nature" of the phallic order (56), and on the accuracy of the Lacanian diagnosis: "Lacan gives an account of how the status of the phallus in human sexuality enjoins on the woman a definition in which she is simultaneously symptom and myth. As long as we continue to feel the effects of that definition we cannot afford to ignore this description of the fundamental imposture which sustains it" (57). 7. Judith Butler, Gender Tro uble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990). Butler's uncompromising insistence on the constructedness of the body is particularly salutary insofar as much criticism-even quite rigorous criticism-shares with modem aes thetics the temptation to fall back on the naturalness of heterosexual difference, particularly when humanist models of "history" are in force. In an important essay, for instance, Mary Poovey notes that one of Shaftesbury's models for aesthetic harmony is the proportionality or fit between the sexes: "Thus," Poovey comments, after examining a similar moment in Burke's Enquiry, "sexual difference, which exists in nature, becomes the fundamental organizing dicho tomy of a semantic system that produces distinctions-and therefore discriminations-in excess of the natural, originary difference." "Aesthetics and Political Economy in the Eigh teenth Century: The Place of Gender in the Social Constitution of Knowledge," in Aesthetics and Ideology, ed. George Levine (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1994), 89-90. My con cern here is to insist on the importance of refusing the temptation to think of sexual difference as "natural." Sexual difference functions as "natural" difference, but only because it has been constructed as such: on this point see Butler, Gender Tro uble, 92 and passim. Elsewhere in the same essay Poovey describes modem aesthetics as involving "the enforcement of a set of truisms about gender" ("Aesthetics and Political Economy," Bo), a claim with which I can agree; it is also plausible to describe aesthetics as participating in a modem "fetishization of sexual difference" (92), so long as one understands fetishism as a naturalizing activity rather than an activity grounded in nature.
tropaic potential of his deconstructive Ve nus, both as a gendered person ification and a personification of gender. Gender, as a "subtle and politically enforced performativity" (Butler, Gender Tro uble, 146) may be said to be grounded in the possibility of fiction, but fiction can only be gendered fictionally. In other words, though the need to personify fiction in gendered terms may be difficult or even impossible to avoid, the resulting gender will never be entirely certain.s
The texts we have read suggest that anxieties and certainties of gender saturate aesthetic discourse without, however, exhausting its problematic.
The Lehrjahre's focus on Mignon and on the maternal resonance of Wilhelm's puppets, for instance, cedes in the Wa nderjahre to a more general spectacle of violence: though it is true that the latter novel's "plastic anat omy" finds its inspiration in Wilhelm's horror before the corpse of a female suicide, the narrative also renders the process of dissection and disinterral indifferent to the particular attributes of its object. In George Eliot's texts, figures for figurative language migrate from Madame Laure and the Princess Halm-Eberstein to Lapidoth and f inally to Theophrastus Such's un canny machines, while Flaubert's L'Education sentimentale plots the course of its deconstruction of fetishism toward a sublimely inhuman spectacle of rocks at Fontainebleau, on the one hand, and a domestic tragicomedy cen tered on Madame Arnoux' s rather sexless and anonymous male child, on the other. At the risk of overschematizing one could say that the question of aesthetics cannot be translated as that of "woman" or "gender" without residue, because its linguistic dilemma cannot be entirely contained within the category of the "human," or even that of the "subject." The imagery of machines and machine-like bodies which we have encountered so fre quently in these novels records this excess of language over the subject. In a post-Romantic idiom, the machine figures the divergence of process from meaning, syntax from semantics: a predicament that can inspire a variety of reactive gestures, as the Wa nderjahre's dark parody of the Aesthetic State demonstrates.
The Wa nderjahre' s political allegory is particularly lurid, and as we have seen can easily be read as a demystification of the aesthetic statism of fascist 8. In this context it is worth noting that Winckelmann's ideal of beauty, in his frequently strange and surprising History of Ancient Art, is hermaphroditic (and also, at certain points, requires the blending of animal parts into the human: Jupiter's hair and brow, for instance, derive from those of the king of the beasts, the lion). See Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums (1764), ed. Wilhelm Senff (Weimar: Hermann Bohlaus, 1964), 127. Meanwhile, Burke's A Philo sophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful, ed. James T. Boulton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), despite-or better, because of-its relentlessly binary organization of its material, will also repeatedly register a certain unsteadiness at the same moment that it enforces its identification of the beautiful with the female body: this latter, for instance, will offer to the male gaze a "deceitful maze ... about the neck and breasts ... through which the unsteady eye slides giddily" (115). ideology; but it is possible to herd some of the consequences of that reading into less dramatic and distant environs. Readers familiar with the debates about fascism's relation to modernism will perhaps not have been sur prised to encounter the question of technology at the epicenter of the aes thetic state, though few may have predicted that this Heideggerian topic would snowball its way through a book on the Bildungsroman. No study of aesthetic ideology, however, can avoid becoming a question concerning technics. As we saw in chapter 4, Heidegger diagnoses modern technology as Ge-stell, "enframing," a process of extracting and stockpiling which transforms the natural world into Bestand, "standing-reserve" -a state in which objects per se no longer exist in or for themselves, but only in or for something else. This evacuation of content within the formality of a (seemingly) total process, however, generates and perpetuates the illusion of a subject of technology. Humanity comes to imagine itself as the will-to power behind technics, while in fact becoming another element to be pro cessed as standing-reserve. Heidegger's work needs to be approached carefully, but I think we can risk the following proposition: aesthetics sees both its own accomplishment and its own destruction in technics. From an aesthetic perspective, technics is formalization. That claim will seem less idiosyncratic if one thinks of Jacques Derrida's extensive, meticulous displacement of Heidegger's question of technics onto the problematic of "writing" -writing understood as the iterability which turns a mark into a sign and which unleashes effects of idealization and formalization that grant writing its enormous technical powers of storage and distribution. If for Aristotle language is the exemplary techne, the Derridean critique spec ifies that "all language is a tele-technology."9 Te chnology may in this sense be said to leave its mark on the world thanks to a power of formalization which language exemplifies. While this insight certainly does not exhaust the purview of the question of technology, it may serve to explain the intimacy between aesthetics and technics, which is never more profound than when aesthetic systems tout their organicism-when, in other words, their techne pretends to the autoproductivity of physis. The limit-case of fascist ideology is usefully dramatic in this regard: its romantic organicism always also involves a glamorization of technical force and, as Walter Ben jamin so clearly saw, finds its fulfillment in the phantasm of total, tech nologized, and apocalyptic war.10 9. Jacques Derrida, Spectres de Marx: L'Etat de la dette, le travail du deuil et la nouvelle Internationale In its sober incarnation, however, the Aesthetic State is something more banally familiar: it is a bureaucracy. The modem individual is a bureaucra tic product: a paradox captured nicely by Friedrich Kittler in his suggestion that the Lehrjahre's Society of the Tower "is a literary bureaucracy and thus is the very institution of the Bildungsroman."11 As a total artwork, which is to say a self-sustaining organic machine, the polis becomes representable as a Circumlocution Office. To be sure, such a state also either misrecognizes itself or hates itself, since its very aestheticism betrays its aesthetic princi ple: in fetishizing the arbitrary tautology of law, it predicates its rationale on the repression of its own arbitrariness. The Wa nderjahre's rhetorical critique of the Aesthetic State troped this paradox as that of the symbol, a figure which, in this particular text's allegory, transforms arbitrariness into a ground for meaning by valorizing the arbitrary as the unknowable. With reference thus bracketed, the symbol becomes a principle of technical force, and the subject of technology-that is, the subject as will-to-power-arises out of (or better, as) the transcendental reserve of the unknowable. From this perspective it becomes understandable that aesthetic bureaucracies valorize secrecy and secrete charismatic attachments, which at the limit collect into the fetish-figure of a national leader. For the same reason, aes thetic bureaucracies are as likely to denounce their own formality as they are to valorize it, since the valorization always involves a betrayal, short coming, or slippage. In this sense one would find in the excruciatingly literary vocation of Kafka the culmination of the aesthetic critique I have located in the Bildungsroman.
At this point, however, we also return to the vicinity of issues broached at the beginning of this book; and by way of conclusion I would like to focus once more on the academic and literary institution, since the understanding described by the title is one in which, in Jiinger's words, "there is no longer any movement whatsoever-be it that of the homeworker at her sewing machine-without at least indirect use for the battlefield." In this totality of movement the German "encounters himself" in the community as form (Gestalt). Benjamin diagnoses this theory as "an unrestrained transposition of the theses of l'art pour !'art to war": see Gesammelte Schriften (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1972 of aesthetics we have achieved should allow us to mark an advance over the discussion I was able to offer in my opening chapter. We may begin by pointing out that the arguments presented here clearly weigh against those of the so-called "new pragmatism," or of the sort of unapologetic profes sionalism advanced in recent years by critics such as Stanley Fish. If aes thetics is the ideology of bureaucracy, pragmatism is this ideology's focused misrecognition and repetition of itself. When one valorizes as "pro fessionalism" the arbitrariness of procedure, one debunks metaphysics only to recover the Subject as will-to-power, whether as an "interpretative community" or as the "steadfastness of purpose" and "core sense of the enterprise" which "makes a field a field."12 Ty pical of the double bind of aesthetics, though, is the fact that overt professionalism never fails to elicit a certain degree of resistance within the aesthetic-pedagogic insitution. For malism never satisfies, even when disguised as pragmatism, with the result that antitheoretical pragmatism regularly encounters a mild version of the resistance to theory, and-as Fish's work demonstrates-finds itself me chanically repeating the same arguments in essay after essay, chasing the shadow of what is in fact its own resistance to its own unacknowledged act of formalization. Academic humanists, and particularly literary critics, ex perience this predicament as a vacillation between the professionalism Fish champions and the "antiprofessionalism" or "self-loathing" he condemns. This vacillation is ultimately institutional rather than personal in origin: if "literature" comes into existence as the formalized procedures of an archive and a scene of instruction, it also comes into existence as a refusal of its own institutionality. The history of the institution of literature records this ten sion as the well-known opposition between humanists and philologists, or critics and scholars.13 The bureaucratization of aesthetic pegagogy as litera ture began as-and to some extent remains-a productive but often frac tious compromise between professionalism and bellettrism: both the fetish ization and the denigration of professionalism are scripted within the literary institution. These comments intend to reinforce as well as complicate John Guillory' s suggestion that "professionalism is ... lodged within bureaucracy as the affirmation of the principle antithetical to bureaucracy itself, the principle Weber called 'charisma."'14 As I noted in chapter 1, Guillory sees bu reaucratic charisma exemplified in the "theory canon" and personified in the figure of Paul de Man. De Man, that is, acquires charisma by seeming to embody an impersonal "rigor"; and Guillory, in a brilliant tour de force, interprets this fetishization of rigor as a blind, defensive repetition of the bureaucratization of the university and of society generally. I proposed then, and can propose with more authority now, that we accept a qualified version of this claim. In the wake of our rhetorical readings in aesthetics it should be clear that the "rigor" of rhetorical reading is a technical formal ism very much at the heart of whatever charismatic force de Man, or "de Manian reading," commands; however, by the same token it is clear that in describing what theory (aberrantly) does, Guillory forgets and to a certain extent unwittingly repeats what theory itself says. A similar qualification needs to be attached to Guillory's larger argument that "the moment of theory is determined ... by a certain defunctioning of the literary curricu lum, a crisis in the market value of its cultural capital occasioned by the emergence of a professional-managerial class which no longer requires the (primarily literary) cultural capital of the old bourgeoisie" (xii). "A certain defunctioning" is built into the literary institution, which is to say-and this is not exactly a surprising discovery-that the "moment of theory" is overdetermined. Theory's emergence in professionalized form as de Ma nian rhetorical reading cannot be isolated from the unprecedented tech nopragmatic restructuring of the university in the twentieth century, but the technologization of education draws its rationale from the ideology which theory critiques.
Wlad Godzich has recently pondered a version of this question by draw ing attention to the fact that the high-cultural debates about "theory" in the United States in the 1980s coincided with a massive "redistribution of money and personnel away from the teaching of literature and criticism and toward the teaching of writing and composition."15 While the teaching of writing and composition is obviously in itself a very desirable thing, Godzich perceives this development-correctly, in my view-as less egali tarian than it looks, to the extent that the new programs can be said to be fundamentally vocationalist in their orientation and rationale. Specific codes such as technical writing, pre-law compositional skills, and so on are taught within the context of a global marketplace in which knowledge is the premier commodity and the university an increasingly rationalized site for the production of knowledge. In linguistic terms one may understand the intimacy between globalism and the teaching of specialized skills as the assumption, or demand, that all codes be universally translatable translatable into the transparency of a universal equivalent, "language." At the limit, Godzich suggests, this techno-universalism would herald the accomplishment of the Hegelian state of Absolute Knowledge, as the state's historical destiny withers into an "all-encompassing concern with effi ciency and competence that takes the form of exclusive specialized practice and rejects as inefficient any broader concerns" (The Culture of Literacy, 14).
In the terms we have worked out here, we may say that at such a point history cedes to the absolute technopragmatism of the accomplished Aes thetic State. And in Godzich' s view, the "growing hegemony" of universal ist pragmatism "has only found literary theory in its path." Theory arises "out of the same ground as the new literacy," since both presuppose a post Enlightenment ideology of a transparently universal language; "but whereas [the new literacy] has sought to accommodate, or even further, the emergence of the posthistorical state, theory has sought to oppose this emergence, frequently as blindly as literacy on its side of the divide" (14).
Those comments largely accord with the findings of this book, though when Godzich goes on to declare that "the gravest menace to theory today" is its "professionalized simulacrum, well ensconced in the system of knowl edge, usurping the voice of the Other while silencing it and the practice of resistance that is genuine theory" (33), one needs to agree with Guillory that the problem has been misstated. Theory's "professionalism" is in a certain sense irreducible, and neither theory's resistances nor its complicities can be taken in isolation from the technopragmatics of aesthetic ideology. What one can say, of course, is that theory demystifies aesthetic ideology, explains how and why it works, and how and why it also at a certain point or in a certain fashion fails to work. If such insights have about them their own seductive sheen of professionalism, they nonetheless possess a critical, diagnostic force that the aesthetic tradition willingly or unwillingly con firms. Theory renders predictable, for instance, Guillory' s tum toward aes thetics at the close of his antitheoretical project, as he invokes, first, the irreducibility of aesthetics ("there is no cultural product, then, which does not possess form, and therefore no way to experience cultural objects with out having aesthetic experience" [Cultural Capital, 336] ), and then goes on to imagine as a "thought experiment" what might happen if "a total democra-tization of access to cultural products" disarticulated "the formation of cultural capital from the class structure and from the markets" (337):
The point is not to make judgment disappear but to reform the conditions of its practice. If there is no way out of the game of culture, then, even when cultural capital is the only kind of capital, there may be another kind of game, with less dire consequences for the losers, an aesthetic game. Socializing the means of production and consumption would be the condi tion of an aestheticism unbound, not its overcoming. But of course, this is only a thought experiment. (Cultural Capital, 340) It is a thought experiment with a long pedigree. We have studied the his tory and the rationale of this Schillerian vision, and it remains only to comment that this book will have been grievously misread if its arguments are taken simply to oppose the values and ideals Guillory invokes. The more access to cultural products is democratized the better; however, it must be said that if " socializing the means of production and consumption" resulted in "an aestheticism unbound," Guillory's utopia would rapidly cease to be one. For better or worse, aesthetics is as conflicted as it is irreducible. Under the right circumstances its terminology remains perhaps our most effective counter to authoritarian or totalitarian or techno functionalist ideologies, but only because these ideologies are themselves aesthetic in rationale. Certainly in the context of the contemporary debate about "culture" one can neither discard nor endorse aesthetics without slipping into highly scripted aesthetic roles and without losing the critical purchase which aesthetics, as theory, affords. In its mobile dependence on context, theory will thus always to some extent resemble pragmatism (which one might think of, in Godzich's phrase, as theory's "profession alized simulacrum"); but where pragmatism imagines for itself a hyper aesthetic, technologized subjectivity (as "hands on" know-how, as inten tionality, etc.), theory takes up the burden of contingency as that of reading. Reading, in this sense, can guarantee neither its own possibility nor the effects of its occurrence; and if there is a highly theoretical sense in which reading is as impossible as it is necessary, there is a more prosaic sense in which reading is frustrating, and leads immediately to the compensatory delusions of professionalism. The promise that thought will someday cap ture history and death remains an irreducible fiction, the hard kernel of what Marx and Engels called "German ideology." Aesthetics itself destroys this aesthetic lure; and though we can hardly help experiencing this destruction as a loss, we also experience it as literature, and inhabit it as history.
